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Abstract
 “Beauty-contest” is a game in which participants have to choose, typically, a number in
[0,100], the winner being the person whose number is closest to a proportion of the average of all
chosen numbers. We describe and analyze Beauty-contest experiments run in newspapers in UK,
Spain, and Germany and find stable patterns of behavior across them, despite the uncontrollability
of these experiments. These results are then compared with lab experiments involving
undergraduates and game theorists as subjects, in what must be one of the largest empirical
corroborations of interactive behavior ever tried. We claim that all observed behavior, across a
wide variety of treatments and subject pools, can be interpreted as iterative reasoning. Level-1
reasoning, Level-2 reasoning and Level-3 reasoning are commonly observed in all the samples,
while the equilibrium choice (Level-Maximum reasoning) is only prominently chosen by
newspaper readers and theorists. The results show the empirical power of experiments run with
large subject-pools, and open the door for more experimental work performed on the rich
platform offered by newspapers and magazines.
J.E.L. classification codes: C7, C9
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1. Introduction
In June 1997, Richard Thaler on one hand, and Antoni Bosch-Domènech and Rosemarie
Nagel on the other, totally unaware of each other endeavor, designed and announced an
experiment on the Beauty-contest game in two different business daily newspapers, in the UK
and Spain, inviting the readers to participate. Five months later, Reinhard Selten and Rosemarie
Nagel (1998) replicated the experiment in a German scientific magazine.
When designing an experiment, many elements are taken into account that can influence
its results. Just to mention a few: 1) Physical environment, 2) Subject pool (gender, education and
training, group identification and friendship, etc.), 3) Number of subjects, 4) Communication
among subjects, 5) Information available to subjects, etc. Each represents a potential treatment or
control. When experimenting with newspaper or magazine readers (i.e., announcing an
experiment in a daily newspaper and inviting its readers to participate in it) the experimenter
looses control simultaneously of all these elements. In addition, two other elements that play a
crucial role in any experimental design can be changed dramatically: 6) Reward, 7) Duration of
the experiment.
However, running experiments in a newspaper helps to answer questions like the
following. Are the results of lab experiments different from those obtained with large numbers of
subjects, who are not the usual students, have plenty of time to ponder their decisions, and can
obtain large prizes? To say it differently, by running experiments in newspapers we put to the test
the critical assumption of “parallelism” between the lab and the field.
Also, experimenting in newspapers has advantages. They are cheap, since sponsors
usually finance prizes. They do not require having a lab or easy access to students. They allow for
a variety of subject pools in terms of interests, knowledge and nationalities, each pool
corresponding to the particular readership of each newspaper. And potentially, they have a huge
educational impact on the public at large, being advertised, described, and analyzed in the mass
media.3
The basic elements of a typical experiment are the following: It usually consists of a
relatively small group of persons (up to 20 subjects), who arrive at the lab at the same time,
participate in an experiment for 1 or 2 hours, and are paid slightly above the equivalent to the
minimum salary per hour. A number of experiments tried to go beyond the basic procedure of
experimenting. The Iowa Electronic Markets may be the best known of them. The advent of
Internet has allowed some experimenters to move out of the lab. Bossaerts and Plott (1999), for
instance, have run several experiments using the Internet as a medium to collect experimental
data, subjects being able to lock in any time they want within a range of several days. Lucking-
Reiley (1999) and List and Lucking-Reiley (1999) test different auction mechanisms selling
sports-cards in a real market or on the Internet. See also Isaac et al (1994) about the difficulties of
large-scale experiments. For a pre-Internet experiment involving hundreds of subjects, Bohm
(1972) is a classic example.
Economists have always questioned whether subjects other than students behave
differently in a given setting. For example, Cooper et al. (1999) study behavior in ratchet effect
games with students, experienced managers, and white-collar workers from China. The main
difference observed is that managers behave differently in games with real world content and
with abstract content. Students act the same in both contexts. Cross-cultural studies have become
fashionable after the work of Roth et al (1991).
Yet, we are not aware of any experiment run in newspapers or magazines. These are
experiments not involving students, with numbers of subjects (drawn possibly from different
cultures) in the thousands, time availability extended to several weeks or months, and with
rewards beyond the usual financial constraints. In a more fundamental sense, these are
experiments with much less control, in a zone between a fully controlled experiment and a
survey.
In this paper we first compare three newspaper experiments of the Beauty-contest game.
1) The experiment run in the Financial Times (FT from now on) by Richard Thaler (1997). 2)4
The experiment run in Expansión (E from now on) -a Spanish daily business newspaper similar to
Financial Times- by Antoni Bosch-Domènech and Rosemarie Nagel (1997a, 1997b, 1997c). And
3) the experiment run in Spektrum der Wissenchaft  (S from now on) -a monthly German science
magazine, the German edition of Scientific American- by Reinhard Selten and Rosemarie Nagel
(1998). We also comment on some methodological points that arise when experiments are
proposed to newspaper and magazine readers.
Second, we relate these experiments to similar ones run in labs, as reported in Nagel
(1995), and to new experimental data involving students, economists and game theorists as
subjects. Third, an essential feature of the present paper is the integration of the statistical
analysis of these independent experiments -involving widely different subject pools, sample sizes,
payoffs and settings- in a single statistical model.  This model enables to capture aspects of the
individual decisions that fit the predictions of a particular game-theoretical model, the model of
iterated best reply, as discussed in Nagel (1995, 1998), Stahl (1996) and Ho et al. (1998).
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we explain the game and its theoretical
predictions. Section 3 contains the design of the newspaper experiments. In section 4 we report
the results of these experiments. In section 5 we compare the lab experiments with the newspaper
experiments. In Section 6 we describe the statistical methods applied to further the comparison.
Section 7 gives the results of the statistical analysis and Section 8 concludes.
2. The game
A basic Beauty-contest game is as follows. A certain number of players each chooses
simultaneously a decimal number, let us say, from the interval [0,100]. The winner is the person
whose number is closest to p times the mean of all chosen numbers, where p < 1 is a
predetermined and known number. The winner gains a fixed prize. If there is a tie, the prize is
split amongst those who tie or a random draw decides the winner.5
The game is dominance solvable. The process of iterated elimination of weakly
dominated strategies leads to the game's unique equilibrium in which everybody chooses 0
1.
Thus, a rational player does not simply choose a random number or his favorite number, nor does
he choose a number above 100p, since it is dominated by 100p. Moreover, if he believes that the
other participants are rational as well, he will not pick a number above 100p
2; and if he believes
that the others are rational and that they also believe that all are rational, he will not pick a
number above 100p
3 and so on, until all numbers are eliminated but zero. The concept of iterated
dominance is an important concept in game theory. The Beauty-contest game is an ideal tool to
study whether individuals reason in steps and how many iterated levels subjects actually apply.
2
Game theory has mostly developed using deductive and refinement concepts. However,
their scarce predictive power in some experiments has turned the attention to alternative
approaches based on bounded rationality and heterogeneity of beliefs. Obviously, once
individuals are assumed not to be fully rational or to be diverse in their beliefs, selection of
equilibria becomes an empirical matter (see, e.g., Schelling (1960), Stahl and Wilson (1995),
Costa-Gomes et al. (1999)).
For the Beauty-contest experiments, Nagel (1995), Stahl (1996) and Ho et al. (1998),
show that a model of iterated best reply describes subjects behavior better than the equilibrium
obtained by iterated elimination of dominated strategies. They classify subjects according to the
number of steps, or depth, of their reasoning. Accordingly, a Level-0 player chooses arbitrarily in
the given interval, with the mean being 50. A Level-1 player gives best reply to Level-0 players
and thus chooses 50·2/3 = 33.333. A Level-2 player chooses 50·(2/3)
2 and so on. A player, who
takes infinite steps and believes that all players take infinite steps, will choose the equilibrium 0.
                                                       
1 The number of steps is infinite. When subjects choose in [1,100] (as in E), a finite number of reasoning steps
leads to the equilibrium. If only integers are allowed (as in F) there are several equilibria. In the case of p = 2/3,
there is an additional equilibrium to “all choosing 0,” which is “all choosing 1.” This is a minor modification that
should not change the game in an important way. However, if p had been equal to 0.9, the equilibria would have
been “all choosing either 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4,” instead of just a unique equilibrium as in the case of real number choices
(see López (1999)).6
The hypothesis of iterated levels of reasoning predicts that choices will be clustered around the
values 33.33, 22.22, 14.81, 9.88, … and 0.
3. Newspapers’ Experiments
3.1 Design
Participants in the Newspapers’ experiments are asked to choose a decimal number in
[0,100] (in [1,100] in E, non-negative integers only in FT). The winner is the person who chooses
the number closest to 2/3 of the average number submitted. Rewards offered and time available in
the Newspapers’ experiments were much larger than rewards offered and time available in the lab
as can be seen in Table 1.
Thaler (1997) and Bosch-Domènech and Nagel (1997a) wrote the instructions without
knowing about each other’s plan of running a newspaper experiment. Selten and Nagel (1998)
had both sets of E and FT instructions when writing their sets of rules for S. Table 1 summarizes
common aspects and differences between the three games run.
3
The newspapers’ editors imposed some of the differences in the instructions. Thaler had
to limit the choices to integers instead of decimal numbers. The reason was a legal restriction
imposed by the lawyer of FT. The lawyer thought that a game with decimal numbers becomes a
game of pure luck, and gambles by private persons or institutions are not allowed in the UK. This
restriction causes a higher number of ties. In order to decide the winner in FT’s contest, “the
judges consider the best answer to be the tie breaker.”
                                                                                                                                                                               
2 For a survey on the Beauty-contest experiments, see Nagel (1998).
3 All data sets used in this paper are available upon request.7




Integer number in [0,100] Number in [1,100] Number in [0,100]
Explanation
of “2/3 of the
mean”
With an example: 5 people
choose 10, 20, 30, 40, 50. The
average is 30, 2/3 of which is 20.
The person who chooses 20 wins
With a definition: suppose
1000 persons participate.
Sum the chosen numbers
and divide them by 1000.
Multiply the results by 2/3.
The winning number is the
closest to this result
No explanation of mean or 2/3 of




“Please describe in no more than
25 words the thought processes
you went through in arriving at
your number”
“If you want to add some
comment about how you
decided to choose your
number, we are interested in
it”
“We will be glad when you also tell
us how you got to your number”
Prize 2 return Club Class tickets to
New York or Chicago donated
by British Airways
100.000 Pesetas (about
$800), paid by Expansión
1000 DM (about $600) paid by
Spektrum
Announceme
nt of  the
rules
Once Pre-announcements of
publication of the game;





13 days 1 week 2 weeks
Submission
form
Postcards Letters, fax, or e-mail Letters or e-mail
Other
restrictions
One entry per household,
minimum age 18, resident of UK;
excluded: employees of FT or
close relatives, any agency  or
person associated with the
competition
One entry per person.
Personnel of Universitat
Pompeu Fabra and direct
family excluded
One entry per participant.




Competition as “appetizer for the
FT Mastering Finance series”...
“Contest will be discussed … in
an article on behavioral
finance…. The series will offer a
mix of theory and practical
wisdom on … corporate finance,
financial markets and investment
management topics”
This is an exercise, an
experiment ... related to
economics and human
behavior. John Maynard
Keynes could say that
playing at the stock market
is similar to participating
in a Beauty-contest game
“Who is the fairest of them all? The
average... according to psychological
tests. However, sometimes it helps
being different from the average by
the right amount.” Tale about a
country Hairia where the most
beautiful person is the one who has





Competition as “appetizer for the
FT Mastering Finance series”...
“Contest will be discussed … in
an article on behavioral
finance…. The series will offer a
mix of theory and practical
wisdom on … corporate finance,
financial markets and investment
management topics”
“This is an exercise, an
experiment ... related to
economics and human
behavior. John Maynard
Keynes could say that
playing at the stock market
is similar to participating
in a Beauty-contest
game…”
“Who is the fairest of them all? The
average... according to psychological
tests. However, sometimes it helps
being different from the average by
the right amount.” Tale about a
country Hairia where the most
beautiful person is the one who has
2/3 of the hair-length of all
contestants





Daily business paper, world
wide distribution, printed in
England, with 391,000 copies
per day.
Daily business paper,
distributed in Spain with
40,000 copies per day.
Monthly magazine, German edition
of Scientific American, distributed
in Germany, with about 120,000
copies per month.
Authors Thaler Bosch, Nagel Selten, Nagel
Table 1. Main features of the Newspapers’ experiments8
Expansión requested that the opening article included a reasoned justification for
performing the experiment. This newspaper did also several pre-announcements of the game,
days before the opening article appeared. Furthermore, without the authors’ knowledge,
Expansión published a shortened version of the opening article containing the rules of the game
on the three consecutive days following its publication. The shorting resulted in the omission that
comments were welcome and that only one number per person would be accepted. In fact, several
participants submitted multiple numbers. However, they only amounted to about 1% of the
entries.
Finally, Spektrum der Wissenschaften asked Selten and Nagel to write a fairy tale,
introducing the spirit of the game. The editor changed the story submitted of a nose-length
Beauty-contest to a hair-length Beauty-contest.
These reported interventions on the part of the newspapers’ editors are examples of how
experimenters who use the mass media as a platform for their experiments may be constrained in
ways that they do not face in the lab. Fortunately, we believe that none of the described
interventions had a significant influence on the results. But other differences in the design of the
experiments, imposed or not by the newspapers’ editors, may have had an impact on the results
and are worth reporting here.
1) Only entrants in the FT experiment were forced to explain their decision
4. It is well known
among experimentalists that requiring subjects to provide explanations may force them to
think the decisions over, bringing about more thoughtful results. However, in E, the average
choice of those entries, which submitted comments was 25.2, whereas the average choice of
entries without comments was 25.5.
2) We know from lab experiments that giving examples can tip decisions. In FT, an example
was provided with the number 20 as the winner. It is not farfetched to ponder whether using
an example that focuses on low numbers did not push entrants towards small ones. Indeed, in
                                                       
4 The FT lawyer believed that if subjects had to make a comment showing their skills in choosing a number, this
could be used in court to prove that the game was not a gamble.9
FT, numbers above 50 were much less frequent than in the other two publications.
5 In
addition, as teachers we know that examples are good didactic devices. Thus, giving an
example may also have helped to educate entrants about the game.
6
3) The number of participants was a parameter that was not directly controlled by the
experimenters, but was certainly conditioned by the design. In E, in spite of having half the
time to answer compared to FT and S, the number of participants was the largest of all. One
reason was the fact that the game was prominently announced in E, where an advertisement
on the first page was run for several days. Another reason might have been allowing fax and
e-mail entries in E, unlike FT which only accepted mailed letters.
4) We all very well know that using e-mail requires little effort. This may have enticed the
participation of people who did not want to spare one moment to think about the game
(“noise players” if you want). Forbidding the use of e-mail and forcing entrants to sit down to
write their decision on a piece of paper, put it inside an envelope, place a stamp on it, and
post it, could also have had an “educational” effect. However, a comparison of the numbers
submitted by mail or by e-mail does not show significant differences.
5) Communication among subjects could not be constrained. In the results section we will
report on some of the consequences of this loss of control, for example, as observed collusion
among some participants.
3.2. Results
Figures 1 to 3 show the relative frequencies of the numbers chosen (the rounding to an
integer is from 0 to 0.5, 0.5 to 1.5, etc.) in the three Newspapers’ experiments. The figures also
indicate the number of participants, the average of all numbers and the number submitted by the
winner. In total there were 7900 participants (3,696 in E, 1,476 in FT and 2,728 in S).
                                                       
5 We will show that when we exclude numbers above 50, the distributions of numbers in FT and S are strikingly
similar.
6  Which, incidentally, may help to explain the higher numbers of 0s and 1s in FT than in E.10
The results seem to confirm the existence of a common pattern of decision-making
among participants, previously identified in lab experiments of the Beauty-contest game and
interpreted as steps of iterated dominance (see references above):
The most popular numbers in all three experiments are two-thirds of 50 (about 33), two
thirds of this number (about 22) and the equilibria of the game (0 and 1 in FT, 1 in E and 0 in S).
The steps of iterated dominance interpretation claims that in the Beauty-contest game people
reason in steps. Step 0, which would be the preliminary step of any reasoning, translates into
numbers that are arbitrarily distributed over the interval, resulting in an expected value of 50
(50.5 if numbers are from 1 to 100). Level-1 reasoning is (2/3)·50 = 33.333. Level-2 reasoning is
(2/3)·33.333 = 22.22 and so on. Taking this reasoning to all its steps of iterated dominance would
lead to choose the Nash equilibrium
7. We report this finding as:
Fact 1: The numbers obtained by the process of reasoning in steps coincide with the
peaks observed in the experiments. This is particular true of the first two steps and the Maximum
step (and to some extent of the third as well).
From the submitted numbers it should be possible to identify those entrants that take one
reasoning step, those taking two steps, perhaps even those taking three steps, and those taking all
the steps down to the Nash equilibrium. This will be done in Sections 6 and 7, using statistical
techniques.
Between the equilibrium choice and step 2 or 3 there are no other notable peaks and in
the comments submitted we could not find anybody who stopped at just 4 steps of reasoning.
Therefore we infer the following additional fact.
                                                       
7 As mentioned in our footnote 1, when subjects have to choose in [1,100], the number of reasoning steps
necessary to reach the Nash equilibrium, 1, is finite. Not so when subjects have to choose in [0,100]. Ho et al.
(1998) call the two types of games finite-threshold and infinite-threshold, respectively. In our one-shot games we










































































































Figure 1 to 3. Frequencies of choices in the three Newspapers’
experiments12
Fact 2: Once subjects reach the second, or third reasoning level, they jump all the
(infinite) steps towards Nash: One, two (three), infinity.
Analyzing the 50 comments of those entrants in the S experiment who describe the
equilibrium process of infinite iteration
8, we find that the average number chosen by them is 6,
with 80% of them choosing below 10. We state this as:
Fact 3: A significant proportion of the subjects (29/50 = 58% in our sample) who reach
all the way to Nash, bounce back to choose a number larger than the equilibrium. However, most
of them (19/29 = 65%), stay below 10 and thus clearly below the numbers corresponding to levels
of reasoning from 1 to 3 (numbers around 33, 22 and 15).
Many economists (see Plott (1993)) have argued that phenomena that appear irrational
could be the result of rational players expecting others to behave irrationally. Fact 3 is an example
that confirms this observation: Many rational players do not choose the Nash equilibrium because
they take into account the bounded rationality of others. But there is another side to this fact:
Fact 4: A significant proportion of subjects (21/50 = 42% in our sample) who comment
on reaching the equilibrium, choose a number from 0 to 1.
Turning the previous statement upside down, we could say that a phenomenon that
appears rational (choosing the Nash equilibrium) may be the result of players expecting,
irrationally, that other players will behave rationally. In other words, that what is taken for
rational behavior represents, in fact, a boundedly rational ignorance of other players bounded
rationality. In psychology this is known as “false consensus” (see Dawes  (1990)), a situation that
appears when people assume that other players reason as themselves.
Notice that numbers above 50 are scarcer in FT than in the other two experiments. One
reason for this fact, already suggested above, may be that in the FT description of the game an
example that selected a low number was presented. Since this may have pointed the way towards
lower numbers in the FT experiment, we may be justified in comparing the experiments using
                                                       
8 We randomly selected 50 comments out of all comments that identify the equilibrium, and classified their
behavior.13
only numbers lower than 50. In Figure 4 we compare the S results and the FT results in a
quantile-quantile plot, when all the results above 50 have been removed form the two
experiments. In the figure, it appears that the distributions of the numbers chosen in both
experiments are almost identical, despite the non-normality of both distributions, the different
subject pools, and the large number of subjects involved. Indeed, there is no significant difference
between the two distributions when applying a conventional test, like the Mann-Whitney-U-test,
despite the high power of the test induced by the large number of observations. Here we have,
then, two experiments, run among two large populations presumed to be rather different (one
made up mostly of UK businessmen and economists, the other made up of German scientists),






Figure 4. Quantile-quantile plot of choices 0 to 50 in FT and S
We can summarize this observation as:
Fact 5: Two large subject pools, drawn from different countries and from
different professional backgrounds, answer the Beauty-contest game in ways that are
statistically indistinguishable.14
5. Comparisons with lab experiments
One purpose, perhaps the main purpose, of running experiments out of the lab is to help
critically assess the assumption of “parallelism”. Do we see, then, similarities or differences
between Beauty-contest experiments run in labs and in newspapers?
Before entering into a detailed comparison, it is worth mentioning some of the basic
differences between the two types of experiments due, most of them, to the increased loss of
control occurred in experiments carried out in newspapers. This loss of control should reshape the
design of experiments’ methodology when moving away from the full control provided by the
lab. It involves:
1.  Sampling error
Experimentalists know that there is sampling error in their experimental results. They
know that their subjects are not representative of the population at large, but are confident they
have the ability to control the relevant characteristics of their samples. In a newspaper
experiment, the experimenter looses some additional control of the sample.
2. Information seeking
Subjects of newspaper experiments may go to great lengths to submit informed answers.
One interesting variety of information-seeking behavior on the part of some subjects consists, of
all things, in running a parallel experiment. Some participants mentioned that they had run
versions of the same experiment among friends, relatives or school classes, to help them decide
what number to submit.
In one case that we comment below in footnote 10, a potential subject of the S
experiment started in the Internet his own Beauty-contest. Another reader of S run the experiment15
in her math-class and then submitted the joint bid of her class mates
9 (which was close to Nash
equilibrium,).
Of the 21 subjects in the S game who reported that they had run their own experiment,
50% chose a number between 12 and 17 (the winning numbers in the three newspapers’ contests
were in this interval), whereas in the total population only 14% chose a number in this interval.
In addition, quite a few participants used an Excel spreadsheet in order to calculate the
best response to a distribution of numbers selected by them, typically with the pivotal numbers 33
and 22 having a high number of frequencies. Whether this behavior may or may not have an
undesirable effect on experiments run in newspapers is perhaps a moot issue, but it certainly helps
to propagate out of academic circles the use of the experimental methodology as a road to
enlightenment.
3.  Coalition forming
If an experimenter wants to avoid the forming of coalitions in the lab there are usually
ways of ensuring that this is the case. Not so in a newspaper experiment. In fact, we know that in
all three experiments there were attempts of coalition forming
10, although with little impact on the
results (except for a larger than expected frequency of 100). Should newspapers experiment
become more prevalent, and prizes larger, readers might find it worth organizing stable coalitions
to participate in them, in the same way that it pays to organize rings of bidders in public auctions.
4. Number of answers per subject
                                                       
9 The comment (see appendix) exemplifies a wide variety of comments we received: a) the idea of choosing a
favorite number, b) reasoning according to the iteration model and c) the equilibrium concept.
10 The attempt was blatant in E. Allowing for the use of e-mail to submit numbers, we made it easy for a ring
leader to spread the word among his e-friends to enter the number 100, so that he could increase his chance of
winning by choosing a large number. In fact, we were recipients of one such e-mails and what we saw was
interesting. The proposition was not a profit-sharing colluding agreement. Instead, the ring leader asked friends to
start a chain-letter of entrants playing 100, mentioning without further details that this way they were participating
in an “economic experiment”. Are we witnessing, thanks to Internet, the spawning of a new form of collusion,
with a leader controlling both information and profits, and some instrumental followers who participate without
gain or cost?16
When large numbers of subjects are involved and the means of communicating between
subjects and experimenters are diverse, it is quite difficult to enforce the rule of “one person one
answer”. On the other hand, this rule becomes less important as more subjects are involved. In
newspaper experiments it may not even make any precise sense to talk about number of answers
per person. One person can send many answers under different names or have her entire family,
or her friends, sending answers on her behalf. We know, for instance, that a schoolteacher invited
over 100 students to participate in the S experiment. The coalition forming problem and the
problem of several answers on the part of a single individual may easily melt into each other.
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that, in some newspaper experiments, a very determinate person
might affect significantly the results by entering a large number of decisions.
Of these potential differences between lab and newspaper experiments, the first two have
revealed themselves as the most interesting. In the remaining of this section we present and
compare the main features of 17 different experiments collected from different sources (see Table
2). Experiments 1 to 5 involve undergraduate students (1-4 in Bonn, 5 in Caltech) with about 5
minutes to think and no communication among them. Experiments 6 and 7 are take-home
experiment and experiments 8 and 9 are in-class sessions which all involve 2
nd year
undergraduate students from the Intermediate Micro classes in Universitat Pompeu Fabra with
very limited knowlegde in game theory. Communication among the students was not constrained.
Experiment 10 is a take-home exercise with game theory students of Bettina Rockenbach,
University of Bonn. Experiments 11 and 12 involve economists (mainly game theorists and
experimentalist). Experiment 13 was done by e-mail at Universitat Pompeu Fabra among
colleagues and graduate students from the Department of Economics and Business. Experiment
14 is an e-mail game run by a participant of the S experiment
11, and Experiments 15 to 17 are the
ones done with readers of S, E and FT, respectively, and reported above.
                                                       
11 To help making his decision, as mentioned above, one participant in the S experiment decided to run on Internet
his own replication of the experiment. The answers that he received show the same common pattern of iterated
reasoning. The winning number in his experiment was 14.81. He submitted a slightly lower number (14.2) and was
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Table 2. Design and structure of 17 experiments
In order to assess the differences among these Beauty-contest experiments in labs and
newspapers and to compare their results, we have constructed in Figure 5 the box plots associated
to the responses in each of the experiments. Notice that box plots are drawn in such a way that
50% of the distribution is below the line dividing the box.
                                                                                                                                                                               


























Figure 5. Distribution of data in single experiments.
The lower and upper side of the box indicates the 2
nd and 3
rd SÍMBOLOSÍMBOLOquartile of the distribution, Q1 and Q3.
Therefore,  the box spans the middle half of the data and the length of the box is the interquartile range (IQR).  The “whiskers”
at either end extend to the smallest and largest observations that are within [Q1 - 1.5 IQR, Q3 + 1.5 IQR]. Points that are outside
this interval are shown with circles.
Note the high variation across experiments of the median of the distribution (i.e., the
level of the line dividing the box). Among the 17 experiments, the first four are clearly
distinguished from the rest by the fact that the Nash equilibrium of the game is never selected.
This corresponds to four sessions run with undergraduates at the University of Bonn (see Nagel
(1995)). This is the most significant difference in the choices observed in lab-experiments and in
newspaper experiments. In experiments 10 and 11 the median of the distribution is close to zero
(50% of the subjects were at the Nash equilibrium).
Other than subject pool, time availability seems to be a factor in the frequency
differences observed in choosing the Nash equilibrium. To test it, we run, at Universitat Pompeu
Fabra, a take-home experiment among undergraduate students with very limited knowledge of
game theory, giving them one week to return their number choice (Experiments 6 and 7). We
observed in it a clear increase in equilibrium choices (about 7%), still below the newspapers19
average frequency of 13%. At the other extreme, when only game theorists are present in the
experiment, the 0-choices are between 20% and 40% (experiments 10-13, with 10 and 13 as
“take-home” experiments).
We can state these results as:
Fact 6: Time availability seems to have some impact on the frequency of equilibrium
responses.
Fact 7: Subject-pool can have an important effect on the frequency of choices near the
equilibrium.
Fact 7 represents a warning. Sampling error has to be carefully monitored in experiments.
In spite of these differences in frequencies, all experiments show a common and
important pattern. We refer to the iterated best reply reasoning introduced in Nagel (1995). A
thorough analysis of this pattern requires the use of statistical techniques. In the following section
we comment on some of the statistical procedures used in previous work and describe the
procedure that we use to analyze the data from the 17 experiments under consideration.
6. Statistical analysis of iterated reasoning
The seminal paper by Nagel (1995) uses the theoretical values of the iterated best replies
starting from 50 (in experiments labeled here 1 to 4) as the center of step-k reasoning intervals. In
the Beauty-contest game, this was the first attempt to characterize empirically the heterogeneous
selection principles of agents assumed to iterate over best replies. From a statistical perspective,
the fact that this method imposes the intervals’ centers instead of estimating their locations,
supposes a drawback.
Stahl (1996, 1998) describes the data of Nagel (1995) with a boundedly rational rule
learning model using the iterated model 50*(2/3)
k. An individual with type-k initial propensity (so
called disposition) is more likely to use rule k than any other rule. In order to avoid identification
problems, the set of dispositions is assumed to be equal to the set of behavioral rules. Players20
evaluate the ex-post performance of these rules using step-k reasoning. The econometric
specification is completed by assuming that the choices in each step of reasoning belong to the
family of truncated normal distributions in the [0,100] interval. For the type called “–1”, players
that do not learn, Stahl (1996) includes an additional uniform distribution. From the econometric
perspective the specification becomes a mixture of distributions where the parameters to be
estimated are the means, variances and proportions of each type. However, from the underlying
theoretical model and the particular specification assumed, the moments of these distributions are
constrained across them. The estimation procedure is maximun-likelihood.
Ho, Weigelt and Camerer (1998) use also Beauty-contest results to investigate the
proportion of players with different levels of reasoning. Their procedure assumes that players, at
each level of reasoning, believe they are at one level of reasoning deeper than the rest. Ho et al.
determine the mean and variance of each level-of-reasoning interval from the value of the mean
and variance of Level-0 players who choose from a truncated normal distribution. The idea being
to assign the outcomes in each interval to the different levels-of-reasoning types. Using
maximum-likelihood, they estimate the mean and variance of Level-0 players and the proportion
of subjects in each interval.
This approach, although interesting, suffers from several shortcomings. First, the results
are very sensitive to the assumption about subjects’ perceptions of each other. Even without
changing the basic iterated dominance criterion, the analysis leads to very different results if
players exhibit different levels of self-confidence. Second, the authors impose a restrictive
specification that ties the mean and the variance of each level-of-reasoning to the mean and the
variance of level-0 distribution.
Stahl and Haruvy (1998) use also maximum likelihood to uncover and test the selection
principles used by different types of agents. The econometric specification is, as in the case of
Ho, Weigel and Camerer (1998) and Stahl (1996, 1998), a mixture distribution model. The
experimental results are obtained from twenty symmetric 3x3 games. The selection principles21
tested include three deductive strategies (payoff dominance, security selection and risk
dominance), three bounded rationality rules (Level-n rules), one optimistic rule, one pessimistic
rule and a hybrid rule. Their methodology also allows testing the homogeneous population model
versus the heterogeneous model. Haruvy and Stahl show that the predictive power of deductive
equilibrium principles is very small and that even a Level-1 rule of bounded rationality has a hit
rate much higher than deductive rules in the homogenous case. For this reason their base model
includes only one deductive rule (uniform Nash equilibrium) instead of the original three. Their
results show that the most likely set-up includes heterogeneous agents with a high weight of
Level-1 bounded rationality rules. Deductive selection principles do not add any predictive
power.
Haruvy (1998) proposes a non-parametric technique to find modes, or local maxima, in a
kernel estimated probability density function. He applies this method to two data sets. The first is
a set of fifteen symmetric 3x3 games. The second one is essentially the same as in Haruvy and
Stahl (1998), with the players being asked to specify the distribution of the other participants’
choices that led to their choices. Therefore, the data were in the form of the probabilities of the
strategies of other agents as described by each agent
12. The main idea of this non-parametric
estimation is to change the bandwith parameter in order to modify the smoothing of the density
surface and to find modes where probability mass is concentrated. The larger the bandwith the
smoother is the surface and, therefore, less modes could be observed.
Our approach, as in Ho et al (1998) and Haruvy and Stahl (1998), is based on a mixture
distribution model, but without imposing any particular structure on the mean and variance of
each distribution in the mixture. The set of experiments that we are analyzing provides multiple
group data {xig, i = 1, …, ng}g=1
G, where  xig corresponds to the choice of the ith subject in the gth
group. As can be seen from Table 3 below, we have aggregated the 17 experiments in 6 different
                                                       
12 An important question with this kind of data is the possibility that individuals are not able to quantify their
beliefs using probabilities.25
Figure 6: The Components of the mixture for the Newspapers’group (exp.15-17).
In addition, in Table 4, we present the log-likelihoods of the different estimations. It is
interesting to note that the mean log-likelihood is similar for groups of experiments, an indication
of similar goodness of fit among groups.
Number of mean
Observations - log L - log L
1. Lab (experiment1-5) 86 361.37 4.20
2. Class (experiments 8,9) 138 557.88 4.04
3. Take home (experiments 6,7) 119 478.82 4.02
4. Theorists (experiments 10-13) 146 544.19 3.73
5. E-mail (experiment 14) 150 593.88 3.96
6. Newspapers (experiments 15-17) 7889 32045.17 4.06
Constrained model 8528 30305.37 3.55
Table 4. Values of minus-log-likelihood of the estimated models
The first result we want to highlight is that all groups have means close to the theoretical
predictions. The constrained model shows means of 33.45, 22.56, and 13.48, when the theoretical
prediction puts them at 33.33, 22.22, and 14.81. If we turn to the unconstrained model and look in
particular at the group of experiments with the largest sample size (Newspapers, row 6), the
means estimated in the decomposition of the data, 33.51, 22.90, and 13.48, appear again quite26
close to the theoretical predictions. Equally important, a comparison of the m-values in the
different groups shows little differences.
On the basis of the statistical analysis above, we can state the following facts:
Fact 8: Stability across very disparate experiments of the mean parameters of the
component distributions.
Fact 9: Estimated mean values are close to the theoretical values predicted by the game-
theoretical model of iterated reasoning.
One could be tempted to carry out a statistical test for the equality of the means of the
composing distributions to the theoretical values predicted by the iterated reasoning hypothesis,
i.e., values of 33.33, 22.22, 14.81, etc. To carry out such test, however, we need to face the issue
of high heterogeneity of the sample sizes across groups. Such heterogeneity induces a high
variation across groups of the power of a test for the same hypothesis. Take for example Group 6
(Newspapers’ experiments) with a sample size of 7,889. If we test for the equality of the first-
level mean to its theoretical value of 33.33, we obtain a t-value of 3.76 that clearly rejects the null
hypothesis (p-value is smaller than 1%). In contrast, if we take a group like Classroom with
sample size 138, the t-value turns out to be 0.30, which clearly leads to acceptance of the null
hypothesis (p-value greater than any reasonable significance value). Therefore, in the large
sample-size group we reject the hypothesis of the first-level mean being equal to the theoretical
value, while we accept it in the small sample size group. But note that we reject the hypothesis of
equality, the estimated mean differs from the theoretical prediction by .12, while we accept the
equality hypothesis when the difference is 1.98. It is important to realize that the variation of the
sample size that conditions the test, is an observation design artifact, nothing to do with the truth
or falsity of the null hypothesis. Clearly, as in many settings, an adequate interpretation of the test
statistics requires to perform a power sensitivity analysis, in order to distinguish between27
statistical and substantive significance.  This is an issue that we are currently investigating, but
that, we feel, exceeds the scope of the present paper.
16
With regard to the estimated proportions of the different reasoning levels, and especially
the Maximum-level reasoning, we observe that they vary considerably across experiments, a
confirmation of Fact 7 above
17. This can be summarized as:
Fact 10: The proportions of subjects in each level of reasoning vary across experiments,
i.e. it is highly determined by subject pools.
In particular, the frequency of equilibrium choices in the Newspapers experiments and in
experiments with subjects trained in game theory is much higher than with un-trained
undergraduates. This reflects the wide variation in the backgrounds of subject pools across
experiments.
18
The hypothesis that subjects have reasoning Levels 0, 1, 2, 3 or Maximum seems to
account, as has been shown, for the choice patterns of a wide variety of very heterogeneous
experiments. One may wonder whether the statistical analysis of the data would give a better fit if
we assumed that no subjects had Level 0 reasoning, i.e., if our mixtures model did not include a
uniform distribution. To assess the need for the uniform distribution in the mixture, we have
performed the analysis without such non-normal component. The results show a significant
deterioration of the fit of the model, as measured by the Schwarz information criterion. This
                                                       
16 Extending the simple t-test to the multivariate setting of the equality of the three- (four-) level means to their
corresponding theoretical values would yield, again, results dependent on the sample size. Indeed, the
corresponding Wald test for the equality of the three means to their theoretical values yields for the Newspapers
and the Classroom groups the values 117.75 and 3.0084 respectively which, compared with a c
2-distribution with
3 degrees of freedom,  induce a  clear rejection of the null hypothesis in the case of the Newspapers group and
acceptance in the case of the classroom group (p-values are  0 and . 39 respectively).
17 This is also true for the conditional proportions in the constrained model, that we did not print here.
18 In fact, a formal test of the null hypothesis that the proportions are equal across groups, conditional that the
component parameters (means and variances of each component) are equal, could be carried out. We take 2 times
the difference of log-likelihoods for the constrained model and the model that assumes identical components and
proportions across groups (this analysis would correspond to pooling all the cases in a single group). The test
statistic equals 8734, which in relation to a c
2-distribution with 25 degrees of freedom (the difference on the
number of parameters estimated) clearly rejects the null hypothesis that all the proportions are equal across groups.
Thus, the data clearly supports the Fact 10.28
confirms that reasoning Level-0 should be included as a uniform distribution in the mixture
model.
Another issue of interest is the testing of the number of normal components of the mixture
model. A test statistic that takes care of the non-standard issue that the null value of the parameter is
at the boundary of the parameter space can be constructed using bootstrap methods. But the power




Experimental results are influenced by what Marshak (1968) called the different costs of
thinking, calculating, deciding and acting. Grand-scale experiments of the sort that can be run
through a newspaper can test whether the results of the lab experiments change under variations
in sample sizes and rewards but also when these different costs are modified. A population more
heterogeneous than undergraduate subjects -as one is likely to encounter in a newspaper
experiment- will include subjects with wide different costs of thinking and calculating (due to
different education, training or information), different cost of deciding (at leisure vs. the time-
constraint imposed in the lab), and different costs of acting (ready access to e-mail and fax or
not). A richer world with less control.
That three experiments, run in different countries, for different newspapers, catering at
different populations, yield results that are similar and, in two cases, indistinguishable from each
other, is a clear indication that we are observing a pattern of behavior that must be quite common.
That, in addition, the iterated reasoning observed with these large and diverse populations is also
a pattern observed in lab experiments with subject pools of undergraduate, graduate students and
economists, seem to clearly indicate that the “parallelism” assumption between lab and field has
                                                       
19 We repeated the previous estimation procedure for K = 5. The results indicate that the theoretical regularities are
sustained (the mean of the fourth composing distribution is on average at 10.14, when the theoretical prediction
would put it at 9.88). But the convergence problems for one group (Theorist) when we use the k=5 specification29
been vindicated for the iterated reasoning hypothesis in Beauty-contest experiments. In fact, we
are not aware that such a wide empirical corroboration of individual behavior has been previously
observed, or even tried.
In addition, the paper shows that some basic patterns of behavior, specifically the
individual depth of reasoning, are subject specific. This observation should warn experimentalists
to apply with caution the results of their experiments to the wider world.
To sum up, the two main conclusions of the paper are:
Conclusion 1: Across subject pools, different sample sizes, and different methods of
selecting the data, iterated reasoning patterns are stable and remain similar to the theoretical
values predicted by the bounded rational model of iterated reasoning.
Conclusion 2: The proportions of subjects employing different levels of reasoning are
subject-pool specific.
                                                                                                                                                                               
could also be taken as indication of overparameterization, at least in the case of small sample size groups.30
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Appendix
Comment by participants in the S-experiment (translation from German into English):
I would like to submit the proposal of students of my math class Grade 8e of the Felix-Klein-Gymnasium
Goettingen for your game: 0.0228623. How did this value come up? Johanna …asked in the math-class whether
we should not participate in this contest. The idea was accepted with great enthusiasm and lots of suggestions were
made immediately. About half of the class wanted to submit their favorite numbers. To send one number for all,
maybe one could take the average of all these numbers.
A first concern came from Ulfert, who stated that numbers greater than 66 2/3 had no chance to win.
Sonja suggested to take 2/3 of the average. At that point it got too complicated for some students and the decision
was postponed. In the next class Helena proposed to multiply 33 1/3 by 2/3 and again by 2/3. However, Ulfert
disagreed, because starting like that one could multiply it again by 2/3. Others agreed with him that this process
could be continued. They tried and realized that the numbers became smaller and smaller. A lot of students gave
up at that point, thinking that this way a solution could not be found. Others believed to have found the path of the
solution: one just has to submit a very small number.
However, they could not agree about how many of the people participating would become aware of this
process. Johanna supposed that the people who read this newspaper were quite sophisticated. At the end of the
class, 7 to 8 students heatedly continued to discuss the problem. The next day I received the following message:
[…] We think it is best to submit the number 0.0228623.